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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
	
Constructing Drug Using Victims:  
Race and Class in Policy Debates on Ecstasy Use in the U.S. 
By  
Sofia Isabel Laguna 
Master of Arts in Social Ecology 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor Mona Lynch, Chair 
 
Sociologists and political scientists examining the social construction of public anxiety 
surrounding drug use in the United States have argued that racial minorities are the targets of the 
harshest drug laws, while middle-class whites are shielded. In this article, I provide further 
evidence that middle-class, white drug users are shielded from harsh punishment by analyzing 
the process through which U.S. legislators and policymakers decide which drug users need 
punishment and which deserve protection and treatment. Analyzing transcripts from federal 
Congressional hearings, I examine the rhetoric of legislators and stakeholder witnesses 
concerning the use of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) by middle-class whites. 
Building on the social construction literature, I use social identity theory to demonstrate how 
legislators within Congressional hearings create in- and out-groups in order to categorize 
different drug users and dealers. My analysis of Congressional hearing language concerning 
white MDMA use demonstrates that Congressional speakers use rhetoric to convince committee 
members and the wider public that middle-class, white drug users are different from drug users 
of color and that the appropriate policy response is education and treatment, rather than 
 vii 
 
punishment. My findings highlight how middle-class, white drug users are characterized 
differently from drug users of color, providing further evidence that U.S. drug policy has 
historically favored middle-class, white drug users.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
	
INTRODUCTION 
	
Between 1998 to 2002, the use of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or 
“ecstasy”) increased in the United States. According to Rosenbaum (2002), 11% of high school 
seniors reported trying the drug in 2000, nearly double the 5.8% reported in 1998. Additionally, 
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported an increase in MDMA tablet seizures and a surge 
in MDMA-related emergency room visits during this time period. Attempting to provide 
evidence of MDMA-related harm, George Ricaurte, a neurologist, argued that the drug caused 
extreme brain damage (Rosenbaum, 2002).  Current-affairs television programme 60 Minutes 
also reported that ecstasy was “the most dangerous drug in America” (Rosenbaum, 2002).  
News coverage surrounding MDMA in the late 1990s and early 2000s sparked public 
concern. However, some of the claims made in this coverage and by policymakers turned out to 
be inaccurate, exaggerated, or taken out of context. For example, MDMA made up less than 1% 
of drug-related emergency room visits during this time period (Rosenbaum, 2002). Further, 
Ricaurte’s study on the effects of MDMA was retracted in 2003 when it emerged that 
methamphetamine had been used in the test (Ahrens, 2013). Nevertheless, inaccurate and 
exaggerated news coverage continued to shape policy that defined who needed to be punished 
and protected from the “threat” of MDMA.  
 In this article, I examine the rhetoric of U.S. policymakers during this period in order to 
analyze their characterization of drug use stereotypically associated with middle-class, white 
youth. My focus is MDMA because of its link to young, middle-class, white users in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, and because it was associated with increased public anxiety (Ahrens, 
2013). In this sense, if offers an apt comparison to the “crack” panic that occurred a decade 
earlier in the U.S. (Provine, 2007). I argue that legislators perceived the use of a drug associated 
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with the white middle class, MDMA, to be more acceptable than drug use linked with people of 
color, and therefore emphasized therapeutic, rather than punitive, responses in policy debates.  
Building on the social construction literature, I use social identity theory (Tafjel & 
Turner, 1979) to demonstrate how legislators created in- and out-groups among different drug 
users and dealers in Congressional hearings. Specifically, I examine how speakers shaped 
categorical definitions of white, middle-class MDMA users. My analysis of their language shows 
how legislators and Congressional speakers used rhetoric to convince committee members and 
the public that white, middle-class drug users are different from drug users of color, and that the 
appropriate policy response is education and treatment, rather than punishment. 
The article proceeds as follows: I provide background on MDMA and the media 
portrayals linking young, affluent whites with the drug during 2000-2002, when this discussion 
peaked in the United States. Next, I delineate my theoretical framework to anchor my analysis of 
how speakers within Congressional hearings construct the meaning of “drug user.” Then, I 
describe my data sources and methods, and present the findings from my content analysis. 
Finally, I explain the significance of the analysis and its broader implications.  
MDMA Use, Media Coverage, and Regulation in the U.S. 
	
MDMA is a psychoactive drug that increases the release of serotonin, norepinephrine, 
and oxytocin in the brain (Meyer, 2013). Depending on the contexts of use, consumers of 
MDMA can experience increased euphoria, empathy, and sociability with others, and long-term 
consumers may experience negative effects such as depression, cognitive deficits, and 
neurotoxicity (Meyer, 2013). Psychotherapists first used MDMA in the 1970s to administer the 
drug to patients to help them communicate their feelings in therapy. In the mid- to late-1980s, a 
younger crowd started using MDMA recreationally in night clubs (Pentney, 2001). In response, 
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the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) assigned it Schedule 1 status in 1998, thereby classifying 
MDMA as dangerous, having a high probability of abuse, and having no accepted medical use. 
The shift in MDMA’s legal status resulted in media attention, which corresponded with greater 
public knowledge about MDMA. This publicity appears to have led to even wider use of MDMA 
in the United States and in international contexts (Pentney, 2001; Rosenbaum & Doblin, 1999; 
Bogt et al., 2002).  
According to national health survey data, MDMA was primarily used by young white 
adults in 2002 (NHSDA, 2003). Despite an increase in Ecstasy use across all racial groups from 
1995 to 2001, politicians and legislators widely perceived MDMA to be a drug used by white, 
affluent youth (Ahrens, 2013; Martins, Mazzotti, & Chilcoat, 2005).  In 2002, 50% of patients 
who mentioned MDMA in emergency department visits were male, 64% were white, and 75% 
were 26 years old or younger (DAWN, 2003). The most recent report on emergency department 
visits in 2011 shows that the majority of MDMA patients were still white (50.76%), although 
their share had decreased, while blacks made up 19.34% and Hispanics made up 13.73%. Similar 
to the 2002 data, a majority of the patients were 18 to 25 years old (DAWN, 2013).   
As MDMA use increased, quantitative and qualitative shifts occurred in mass media 
coverage of the drug between 2000 and 2002. According to Ahrens (2013), U.S. newspapers 
published 117 articles on MDMA in 1999, but this number increased to 725 in 2001. Before this 
increase, news articles discussing MDMA portrayed the drug and its users as threats to society. 
This shifted from 2000 to 2002, when news articles increasingly portrayed MDMA use as an 
“epidemic” affecting suburban communities. The news reports focused on the tragic MDMA-
related deaths of young people in suburbia, and did not frame users as harmful or criminal, as 
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had been the case with crack-cocaine users (Ahrens, 2013). At the same time, Congressional 
hearings and policy debates increasingly discussed how to control MDMA use (Ahrens, 2013).  
There was a corresponding relationship between media coverage and the laws proposed 
during this period. Between 2000 to 2001, multiple anti-ecstasy laws were proposed at the 
federal level, such as the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Bill and the Ecstasy Prevention Act of 2001 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Both bills proposed to provide funds for law enforcement to target MDMA 
traffickers and manufacturers. Additionally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission proposed increases 
in mandatory minimum sentences for possession for sale of ecstasy. Although these proposed 
changes to federal laws were not passed, similar laws were passed in some state jurisdictions 
throughout 1998 to 2002 (Rosenbaum, 2002).  This study will focus on hearings surrounding the 
proposed legislation at the federal level to understand how U.S. Congressional speakers 
attempted to control, manage, and frame MDMA users and dealers.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
	
Sociologists and political scientists have examined the social construction of public 
concern surrounding drug use (e.g. Cohen, 1972; Reinarman & Levine, 1997; Provine, 2007; 
Musto, 1973; Beckett, 1997), as well as social problems more generally (e.g. Goode and Ben-
Yehuda, 1994). A key work in this literature is Cohen’s (1972) study of “moral panics” and “folk 
devils” – exaggerated reactions by “moral entrepreneurs” (influential actors including media, 
politicians, and the public) to perceived threats to societal values. Moral panics often lead to new 
laws and policies aimed at decreasing the threat and reinforcing societal values (Goode & Ben-
Yehuda, 1994). Moral entrepreneurs define some behaviors as acceptable and seek to limit those 
defined as unacceptable through social control measures. There is empirical evidence to support 
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the social construction framework, as well as the concepts of moral panic and moral 
entrepreneurs (Beckett, 1997; Omori, 2013).   
 In his examination of the social construction of drug scares within U.S. society, 
Reinarman (1994) argues that linking illicit drug use to subordinate groups leads to policies 
designed to control these groups. Reinarman and Levine (1997) analyze American drug scares 
during the 1980s, such as the crack-cocaine “epidemic”, in which the media, politicians, and the 
medical establishment framed economically marginalized African Americans as crack-cocaine 
users. Reinarman and Levine (1997) argue that rather than addressing the “enduring and 
intensified” socio-economic and political deprivation of African Americans, politicians blamed 
the social problems on crack-cocaine use. This political scapegoating and the criminalization it 
produced reflected societal fear of disadvantaged African Americans and crack-cocaine 
(Reinarman & Levine, 1997). The new crack-related sentencing laws passed in response to this 
panic differentially punished crack and powder cocaine, despite the pharmacological similarities 
between the two substances. By increasing punishment for crack-cocaine defendants, legislators 
criminalized poor African Americans who were perceived to be the primary users of the drug.  
 Further evidence is provided by Provine (2007), who argues that racial minorities are the 
targets of the harshest drug laws while white drug users are shielded from them. She traces the 
historical trajectory of marijuana as a social problem, arguing that not all users are framed as 
criminals. In the 1920s, Mexican immigrants who migrated to western states for farm labor were 
linked with marijuana (Provine, 2007). The onset of the Depression led to an economic downturn 
and decreased the need for Mexican labor, resulting in white indignation toward Mexican 
groups. Harry Anslinger, a moral entrepreneur and the chief of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
during this period, cultivated concern by rhetorically constructing images of Mexican workers 
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who used marijuana and engaged in violence (Provine, 2007; Reinarman & Levine, 1997). This 
image catalyzed legislative efforts to regulate or prohibit marijuana in several states, eventually 
resulting in federal prohibition. The rhetorical linkage of marijuana use to Mexican groups 
followed the traditional pattern of moral panics: it created a volatile, increased level of concern 
and hostility toward Mexican groups, a societal consensus on the threatening nature of this 
behavior, and an exaggerated response from moral entrepreneurs. 
As marijuana use extended to white, middle-class youth in the 1960s, an urgent 
conversation was sparked regarding marijuana decriminalization (Provine, 2007). Spiro Agnew, 
Vice President for Nixon, acted as a moral entrepreneur when he argued that marijuana was 
moving into the suburbs and punitive drug laws were “ruining promising young lives” (Provine, 
2007, p. 97). The prospect of imprisoning large numbers of young white people provoked a 
softening of criminal penalties and enforcement of marijuana laws. Provine’s (2007) work 
illuminates how drug users of color are marginalized by the social construction process, and face 
greater risk of punishment than their white counterparts. Although a consensus emerged that 
marijuana use was a social problem among white youth in the 1960s and 1970s, the policy 
response was pragmatic and measured – emphasizing decriminalization – rather than punitive.  
 Recent research on the racialization of drug use has examined variations in the 
construction of “whiteness.” According to Netherland and Hansen (2016), class is a significant 
factor in predicting policy responses to white drug use. For example, stimulant use by middle 
class or affluent whites is framed as enhancing job performance rather than raising concerns 
about addiction (Netherland and Hansen, 2016).  However, the response is markedly different 
when stimulants such as methamphetamine are linked to economically marginalized whites. 
Murakawa (2011) explains that methamphetamine created concern about the declining status of 
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white people because of its association with “meth mouth,” with poor dental health being 
perceived as a marker of social status. Similarly, Linneman and Wall (2013) suggested that the 
“Faces of Meth” campaign reflected larger cultural anxieties and was used to regulate the 
boundaries of “a ‘white trash’ Other who threatens the supposed purity of hegemonic whiteness 
and white social position” (Linneman and Wall, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, when 
methamphetamine users are discussed in American newspaper articles, journalists tend to 
respond sympathetically by focusing less on violence and more on the drug’s threat to public 
health, the environment, and the potential health issues for methamphetamine users (Cobbina, 
2008).  
 The recent opiate “epidemic” in the U.S. has also been framed more sympathetically in 
the media than past opiate scares involving people of color. Netherland and Hansen (2016) argue 
that middle class, white opiate users are perceived as non-threatening individuals living in the 
suburbs and as victims of addiction worthy of empathy. The non-threatening representations of 
middle-class, white opiate users have resulted in therapeutic responses to the drug issue 
(Netherland and Hansen, 2016).  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
	
Social identity theory can help address the inherent contradiction in the existing literature 
about the racialization of drug panics by examining how both sympathetic and demonized groups 
are rhetorically created by political moral entrepreneurs.  Tafjel and Turner (1979) define social 
identity as an individual’s sense of who they are based on their memberships in different groups. 
The social world is divided into different in-groups and out-groups through a process of “social 
categorization”. By taking part in social categorization, individuals make sense of their social 
environment and group identity. Social identity theory predicts that members of social groups 
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will seek to find negative aspects of out-groups in order to enhance their self-image. This theory 
offers insights into how middle-class, white drug users are defined and the policy responses that 
arises from these definitions.  
 Although Provine (2007) and Peterson (1985) do not explicitly use social identity theory 
in their research, their analyses reveal how social categorization plays a role in the construction 
of policy responses and the legal treatment of drug users and dealers. Because policymakers are 
predominantly white and relatively privileged, they place drug users and sellers of color in out-
groups, and punish them accordingly. Conversely, drug-involved individuals who are 
demographically similar to policymakers, such as middle class white youth, are seen as in-group 
members more deserving of education, treatment, and milder punishment. Thus, Provine’s 
(2007) analysis of the racial constructions of marijuana users over time reveals the different 
policy responses that come with in-group and out-group social categorization. Peterson’s (1985) 
analysis of legislative debates addressing major drug law reform in 1970 likewise found that 
lawmakers considered young and middle-class, white marijuana users as members of their own 
in-group whose lives would be ruined by a drug conviction.  
 While scholars studying social construction and moral panics have focused on racial 
differences in drug policies and the construction of drug users as a social problem (Provine, 
2007; Reinarman & Levine, 1997; Musto, 1973; Peterson, 1985), the social categorization 
process at the core of social identity theory provides additional insights into the mechanisms at 
work in the creation of moral panics and the associated racial subjugation. Therefore, I 
incorporate social identity in the forthcoming analysis to examine whether MDMA users, on the 
basis of racial and other characteristics, were placed into an out-group as the folk devils of the 
MDMA moral panic or if they were placed within an in-group that has a sympathetic or relatable 
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social identity. This analysis aims to provide insights into how race shapes the framing of 
specific groups as folk devils within a single moral panic. More specifically, I examine whether 
MDMA drug users are largely exempt from hostile and exaggerated responses due to their 
rhetorical construction as in-group members. In doing so, I offer a more dynamic, midrange 
analysis of the construction of political rhetoric about drug users. 
I examine the rhetorical construction of MDMA use, a behavior associated with young, 
middle-class whites, by federal lawmakers and other stakeholders in the context of legislative 
hearings that took place in the early 2000s when the MDMA scare was at its peak. Like 
Provine’s (2007) and Peterson’s (1985) historical analysis of the framing of white, middle-class 
drug users in political rhetoric, I am interested in understanding whether MDMA users are 
constructed as victims rather than threats because of their perceived demographic characteristics. 
I address two questions. First, how do the moral entrepreneurs, the Congressional hearings’ 
speakers, frame the social problem of MDMA? More specifically, are MDMA users framed as 
the out-group, or “folk devils”, within the moral panic or do moral entrepreneurs construct 
alternative “folk devils” in need of control? Secondly, and more broadly, what forms of rhetoric 
are used to construct MDMA users, and how do these forms differ from those used in past drug 
scares and moral panics?  
METHOD 
	
My starting hypothesis was that MDMA users would be frequently constructed in 
policymakers’ rhetoric as white middle class victims, whereas users of other drugs, such as 
crack-cocaine, would be frequently constructed as people of color and/or attributed lower 
economic or social status and associated with criminal activity. Moreover, I hypothesized that if 
MDMA users were constructed as in-group members, legislators would argue for therapeutic 
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policies in order to “save” them. Conversely, I predicted that the speakers would categorize drug 
dealers and traffickers as members of an out-group who deserved punishment, as has been 
described in past work.  
I examine U.S. Congressional discourse surrounding MDMA use by analyzing four 
Congressional hearings that took place between 2000 and 2002. This time frame was chosen to 
reflect the peak period during which MDMA users were perceived as white, suburban youth in 
media and policy discussion (Ahrens, 2013). U.S. newspaper articles focused on MDMA 
increased during this time period, peaking in 2001 (Ahrens (2013, p. 404). National research also 
suggests that MDMA was predominately used by white youth throughout this time (NIDA, 
2006). My goal is to examine the way legislators describe and propose to manage the behaviors 
of MDMA users and dealers. My analysis will focus, in particular, on whether legislators place 
MDMA users and dealers into separate in-groups and out-groups. 
To locate the relevant Congressional hearings within my timeframe of interest, I searched the 
ProQuest database for hearings related to the keywords “Ecstasy” or “MDMA” from 2000 to 
2002. I screened each hearing to determine relevance to my study, and chose hearings that 
focused specifically on MDMA use in the United States. This screening process yielded four 
hearings included in my analysis.   
 Two hearings were focused on a proposed piece of legislation that attempted to control 
MDMA trafficking and the use of MDMA among youth. The first hearing in this category, titled 
“Threat posed by illegal importation, trafficking, and use of ecstasy and other club drugs,” was 
held in June 2000 before the Subcommittee on Crime in the House of Representatives. The 
hearing’s purported purpose was to discuss the abuse and trafficking of club drugs as it related to 
the Youth Drug and Mental Health Services Act, which was enacted to authorize more 
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programming to prevent substance abuse among youth. The second hearing, titled “Reducing 
Americans’ Vulnerability to Ecstasy (RAVE) Act of 2002,” was held in October 2002 before the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security in the House of Representatives. 
This hearing is related to the proposed RAVE Act of 2002, which attempted to amend the 
Controlled Substances Act so that sentencing would be harsher for club owners. Although this 
bill did not pass, a related act, The Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, was passed as a 
rider to the PROTECT Act of 2003 (which focused on the prevention of child abuse and the 
investigation and prosecution of violent crimes against children) and contained similar penalty 
provisions (Epstein, 2014). 
The other two hearings were not related to legislation and were held by specific 
subcommittees within the Senate to discuss the threat and problems associated with MDMA use. 
The two hearings, “Ecstasy: Underestimating the Threat,” held in July 2000 before the 
Subcommittee on Crime, and “America at Risk: The Ecstasy Threat,” held in March 2001 before 
the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, both focused on club drug use among young 
adults. All four hearings were addressed by a range of speakers with varied professional 
affiliations, from members of Congress itself, to law enforcement and medical experts (see 
Tables 1 and 2 for more information on speakers).  
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Table 1: Number of speakers in each professional category (N=33) 
Congressional Representatives 8 
University Professors & Researchers 5 
Drug Enforcement Administration 4 
MDMA Users 3 
Law Enforcement 3 
U.S. Customs 3 
Non-Profit Organization/Policy 2 
Investigator (District Attorney’s office) 1 
Emergency Room Staff 1 
National Drug Control 1 
State Drug Control 1 
U.S. Sentencing Commission 1 
 
Table 2: Race of Congressional speaker (n=33) 
 
 
 
Qualitative content analysis was used to code and analyze the hearing transcripts. 
Qualitative content analysis is an appropriate methodology because it allows me to 
systematically delineate how legislators construct MDMA users and dealers, and to examine 
their underlying meanings. I combine this methodology with discourse analysis, which focuses 
on the construction of social reality through language (Schreier, 2012, p. 47). Discourse analysis 
provides a “critical interpretive attitude” (Schreier, 2012, p.48), which I use to understand how 
messages are conveyed within political rhetoric. Additionally, narrative analysis is an 
appropriate method to analyze Congressional hearings and debates because they follow “a 
narrative structure by posing a problem, explicating the complication, and arguing for a solution” 
(Lynch, 2015, p. 280). I focus on the narratives engaged by legislators and key stakeholders 
when arguing their points in the Congressional hearings.  
White 24 
Black 3 
Unknown 6 
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 In the current study, I analyze policymakers’ discourse rather than that used in media 
reports, which has been the focus in other research studies on white drug scares (Netherland and 
Hansen, 2016).  Both forms of discourse contribute to the social construction of an issue (Cohen, 
1972). However, because news production works to short timelines, writers are less able to 
consider the ways in which their language contributes to inaccurate accounts of people of color 
(Campbell, 1995). In contrast, the language of Congressional hearings is more thoughtfully 
articulated and strategically planned before being presented. Stewart (2012, p. 600) argues that 
“policymakers define their position and seek to influence other politicians and the larger public,” 
and their arguments shape perceptions of acceptable behavior in society.  However, this level of 
planning means that politicians may intentionally choose their words to conceal the motivation 
underlying arguments. Examining Congressional hearings allows an analysis of the ways in 
which speakers, as moral entrepreneurs, construct the MDMA moral panic and frame the 
behavior of MDMA users and dealers. 
Coding Frame 
	
 After screening the hearings, I created a coding frame deductively based on my 
theoretical framework, and inductively through an open coding process. My goal in creating the 
coding frame was to focus on the construction of MDMA users and dealers, the construction of 
MDMA as a social problem, and the suggested policy responses. Additionally, I focused on 
whether the hearings discussed raves and clubs as dangerous spaces and blamed club owners or 
event promoters for allowing drug use in these spaces. For example, one code within the rave 
category captured whether the rave was described as regulated or unregulated, and therefore 
perceived as legitimate or illegitimate, and whether it was defined as a frequently attended space. 
Coding for rave attendance captured whether the events were constructed as popular or not.  For 
 14 
 
the event promoters, I coded whether legislators associated them with positive or negative 
language.  
Following the creation of the deductive codes, I assessed one hearing, “Threat posed by 
illegal importation, trafficking, and use of ecstasy and other club drugs,” to check for inductive 
codes that may not have been apparent in the existing literature. From this process, I created 
codes to identify how MDMA was compared to other drugs, how its effects were characterized, 
and whether speakers connected MDMA use to other criminal activities. Lastly, I developed a 
code for the types of suggested policy responses to the problem of MDMA use, dealing, and 
trafficking. These included increased punishment, additional law enforcement, treatment 
expansion, and educational interventions. The purpose here was to assess whether policymakers 
proposed milder punitive policies for young, affluent, white drug users, as described by Provine 
(2007) and Peterson (1985). I captured the strategic use of policymakers’ language through my 
coding strategy. After compiling the common codes, I determined whether and how speakers 
placed users and/or dealers into in-groups and out-groups by examining the codes within the 
context of the hearings. 
In the next two sections, I consider the following questions: (1) How are MDMA users 
and dealers framed by speakers within the Congressional hearings? and (2) how does the 
language surrounding MDMA users and dealers differ from that used in past moral panics 
surrounding drug users of color? 
FINDINGS 
Framing MDMA Users and Dealers 
	
In their rhetorical descriptions of MDMA users, Congressional speakers position MDMA 
users as members of their own in-group, while positioning other drug users as members of 
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blameworthy out-groups. To do this, they established the in-group by describing MDMA users 
as their own children or as individuals with similar values. Speakers argued that MDMA users 
were different from other drug users, chose the drug for empathetic reasons, and posed little 
threat to society. Thus, they proposed education and treatment as policies to manage the 
“epidemic”. In contrast, Congressional speakers described out-groups as comprising MDMA 
manufacturers, traffickers, and dealers. Speakers described the strategies that the out-groups 
utilized to convince “innocent” young people to use MDMA and proposed punitive policies to 
control this threatening behavior.  
Establishing in-groups 
	
Throughout the Congressional hearings, speakers argued that MDMA had spread to 
different geographic locations. More specifically, MDMA had moved from exclusive, illicit 
spaces like raves into familiar spaces such as schools, house parties, and night clubs. When 
describing these geographical changes, legislators frequently brought up MDMA overdoses 
within “nice” suburban neighborhoods. For example, Steven Rust, a Delaware police department 
sergeant, explained how MDMA labs were now found in suburban neighborhoods: 
What we found peculiar was that gone were the run-down neighborhoods 
infested by crack cocaine. We found ourselves in a nice, scenic 
neighborhood overlooking a river of Salisbury. Evidence of a lab was 
recovered from the basement of the residence, and the suspect was 
charged with possession of Ecstasy and related charges. (America at Risk: 
The Ecstasy Threat, 2001, p. 93)  
In talking about the spread of MDMA into suburban neighborhoods, speakers highlighted 
how MDMA was becoming popular and dangerous among affluent young adults – young adults 
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who could be their own children. Judy Kreamer, President of Educating Voices, Inc., captured 
this sentiment: 
Society, and most importantly our children, are being duped into believing 
that illegal drugs are safe. They do not understand the dangers associated 
with their use. This can only be countered through education, networking, 
leadership, and a national determination. (RAVE Act, 2002, p. 16) 
Speakers argued that users of MDMA ranged from high school students to productive young 
adults, again using the “our children” framing. Dr. Donald Vereen established the connection 
between the speakers and MDMA users in his statement: 
I serve as the Deputy Director of the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy. Professionally, I wear two hats – that of the Deputy Director of a 
Congressionally mandated office, and that of a physician with psychiatric 
training. In addition to my two professional hats, I am also a father. The 
dangers of MDMA are a threat to my own children, and that is probably 
the most important credential that I have. (America at Risk: The Ecstasy 
Threat, 2001, p. 9) 
By highlighting the shift of MDMA use into suburban neighborhoods and that the “MDMA 
epidemic” threatened their own children, legislators and Congressional speakers asserted that 
MDMA users were a part of the speakers’ in-group. 
 
In-group MDMA users are different 
	
To strengthen the assertion that white, middle-class MDMA users were members of the in-group, 
hearing speakers made favorable comparisons between MDMA users and users of other drugs. 
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To do this, they often contrasted MDMA to other drugs and argued that there were crucial 
differences between the substances. For example, Senator Feinstein from California argued that 
MDMA was less problematic than methamphetamine: 
I am concerned, however, that by equating penalties for ecstasy 
trafficking with those for methamphetamine trafficking, the bill may not 
adequately acknowledge the difference between the two drugs. For 
instance, ecstasy is not addictive. And the use of ecstasy has not resulted 
in the same level of harm that methamphetamine use has inflicted upon 
the people of my own state and the nation. (Ecstasy: Underestimating 
the Threat, 2000, p. 11)  
 Legislators repeatedly argued that MDMA users are not “typical” drug users because 
they are educated, employed, and uninvolved in crime. Steven Rust, the police sergeant cited 
above, argued that MDMA users and rave attendees were “Kids who should be participating in 
little league, soccer, basketball, football, and youth groups are now looking for excitement at 
raves” (America at Risk: The Ecstasy Threat, 2001, p. 91-92). 
Reasons why in-group members use MDMA 
	
Legislators and other speakers put forth several reasons to explain the use of MDMA by young 
people. John Varrone, acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the U.S. Customs Service, 
argued that young people were vulnerable to the drug’s appealing physical appearance, 
describing how ecstasy pills were brightly colored with stamps of attractive logos (Threat of 
Illegal Importation, 2000, p. 27). Andrea Craparotta, an investigator at a New Jersey prosecutor’s 
office, explained this phenomenon: 
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Ecstasy has emerged as a favorite among today’s youth. Unlike the well-
known dark images of heroin and cocaine addiction that the public has 
become familiar with, many think that Ecstasy is a harmless pill that has 
no adverse effects on society. Young adults who would not consider 
sticking a needle in their arm or smoking from a crack pipe are now 
popping Ecstasy at an alarming rate. (Threat of Illegal Importation, 2000, 
p. 55)   
Steven Martin, a researcher at the University of Delaware, argued that young people used 
MDMA as an alternative to “binge drinking” (Ecstasy: Underestimating the Threat, 2000, p. 62). 
Past research has demonstrated that heavy drinking is common among college students and other 
young people. Additionally, this literature frames binge drinking as problematic, despite the legal 
status of alcohol. By comparing MDMA to such drinking, Martin linked MDMA use to a 
problematic (if largely accepted) behavior, an established social problem common among young, 
educated adults. 
Various Congressional speakers argued that young people chose to use MDMA because 
they were misinformed and saw no risks with using the drug. A common point made by speakers 
was that young people used MDMA because they could not see any immediate negative damage. 
Additionally, Congressional speakers argued that young people received information on MDMA 
from peers or dealers who sold them the drug, and proceeded to use it because they believed it to 
be safe. Andrea Craparotta also argued that users did not consider the consequences associated 
with use of the drug: 
It is easy to buy as candy. It is everywhere. It looks like something you 
would want to  ingest. There is nothing ominous about an Ecstasy pill. And 
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because it causes them to dance and hug, it has this whole love-drug type 
effect, I just believe that they are not  thinking in terms of what damage it 
is causing to their brains at the time. They are thinking of this in terms of 
how much fun they are having when they are on it (RAVE Act, 2002, p. 
55). 
While legislators asserted ignorance as a reason for taking MDMA, they added that young users 
were also vulnerable to peer pressure. In his speech, Senator Biden, from Delaware, argued that 
if potential users saw their friends using the drug and maintaining productive lives, they would 
believe that MDMA is not harmful: 
Part of the testimony to the danger of a drug is students or young people 
observing their peer group and watching what effect it has or doesn’t have 
on them. We can say all we want about how dangerous a drug is, but if 
your roommate has been using the same drug and you have known it for 
over a period of a year and your roommate still has a 3.5 GPA and your 
roommate is still popular and your roommate is still playing rugby or 
intramural basketball or running three miles a day, then it is kind of hard 
to suggest to people that it has this debilitating impact. (Ecstasy: 
Underestimating the Threat, 2000, p. 76) 
Asa Hutchinson, the administrator of the DEA, argued that young people are impulsive 
and experimental, thereby creating empathy for MDMA users (RAVE Act, 2002, p. 5). Several 
speakers argued that raves and clubs were appealing to a younger and affluent crowd because 
they provided a space for young people to build a sense of community. With these claims, 
speakers displayed empathy with motivations for MDMA use. 
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Threat of drug use among in-groups 
	
MDMA-related overdoses occurring in suburban neighborhoods and the health risks of MDMA 
use were common points of discussion among Congressional speakers. They argued that MDMA 
would lead its users to make poor sexual choices, affect their ability to take educational classes 
and seize opportunities, and ultimately make them less productive. More importantly, speakers 
argued that the drug’s effects would lead to the loss of the next generation of leaders. Steven 
Rust, for example, argued that, “If action is not taken soon, I thoroughly believe we risk the loss 
of the next generation of leaders in our communities as well as our Nation” (America at Risk: 
The Ecstasy Threat, 2001, p. 94). Speakers also raised concerns about potential MDMA 
addiction, which was characterized as a disease that led young people to become more involved 
in criminal activities.   
 In addition to raising concerns about health risks, speakers argued that users were 
exposed to other threats at rave events where MDMA use was taking place. Eladio Paez, a 
detective with the Miami Police Department, described the dangers of the rave scene in his 
statement:  
These events are also a haven for sexual predators. They engage in 
hugging, kissing, caressing each other, massaging themselves…That 
person that was previously involved in hugging and kissing will no 
longer be able to make a decision whether they want to have sex or not. 
That is why it is a haven for sexual predators. (Threat Posed by Illegal 
Importation, 2000, p. 57) 
Policy for protecting in-groups 
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Congressional speakers recommended policy directed at protecting MDMA users. They 
discussed the disproportionate effect of mandatory minimum sentences on drug users of color in 
an effort to avoid these policies for MDMA. Sheila Jackson Lee, a Texan representative in 
Congress, explained in her statement: 
[T]hough I support increased penalties for drugs like Ecstasy, I do not 
support the use of mandatory minimums because the use of mandatory 
minimum sentencing requirements often has a disproportionate effect upon 
people of color. (Threat Posed by Illegal Importation, 2000, p. 2)  
As an alternative to mandatory minimum sentences, education and treatment were highlighted 
for MDMA users. Senator Jeff Sessions, from Alabama, who continues to be among the most 
avid supporters of drug-related mandatory minimum sentences, proposed a treatment-focused 
juvenile court (America at Risk: The Ecstasy Threat, 2001, p. 27). Speakers highlighted the 
importance of informing young people about the consequences of using the drug. In addition, 
speakers argued that parents, the medical community, and law enforcement also needed to be 
better educated about these risks. Philip Jenkins, a history and religious studies professor at 
Pennsylvania State University, proposed the use of harm reduction: 
If we want more deaths stemming from the use of club drugs, then the 
way to do that is straightforward. We should increase penalties, initiate 
more active policing, and drive the club scene further underground. I 
would recommend that we should look more at the concept of harm 
reduction as opposed to trying to squeeze ever more people into our 
already overcrowded prison systems. (Threat Posed by Illegal 
Importation, 2000, p. 66)  
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However, the harm reduction proposal was ignored and one speaker questioned whether Dr. 
Jenkins was encouraging drug use among young people (Threat Posed by Illegal Importation, 
2000, p. 74).  
Who are the folk devils? The creation of out-groups 
	
Congressional speakers argued that dangerous out-groups were responsible for youth 
experimentation with MDMA. Speakers framed manufacturers, traffickers, dealers, and rave 
promoters as the folk devils responsible for the MDMA “epidemic” among young people. 
Speakers linked the manufacturers and traffickers of MDMA to powerful organized crime 
groups. They argued that the organized crime groups selling MDMA were largely foreigners. For 
example, Asa Hutchinson, the DEA	administrator cited above, argued that Israeli, Russian, and 
European organized crime groups, as well as Mexican and Columbian cartel traffickers, were 
responsible for increased MDMA use (RAVE Act, 2002, p. 9). Raymond Kelly, the 
Commissioner of the United States Customs Service, also highlighted foreign involvement in 
MDMA distribution as well as the health risks of use “for our young people”:  
Israeli crime groups dominate the distribution of the drug, but other 
violent trafficking organizations are getting involved. The fact is Ecstasy 
is attracting the worst the criminal world has to offer. That is a major one 
of our concerns, but certainly equally disturbing are the health risks it 
poses for our young people. (Ecstasy: Underestimating the Threat, 2000, 
p. 32) 
 Speakers argued that rave promoters provided a dangerous space for young people to use 
MDMA and listen to music. They highlighted how rave promoters profited from a culture of 
MDMA by providing a central meeting space to use the drug and using marketing strategies to 
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lure young people to their events. Eladio Paez, the Miami police detective cited above, argued 
that rave promoters provide a false sense of security: 
Promoters and club owners…go as far as hiring police officers as security 
at these events, creating a false sense of security for those unsuspecting 
parents that drive and drop off their teenagers at the non-alcoholic events. 
This is an alarming problem that we are facing and we cannot allow the 
fact that uninformed law enforcement is aiding these events and are 
standing guard outside these events while kids go inside and do drugs.  
(Threat Posed by Illegal Importation, 2000, p. 57)  
Other speakers claimed that promoters made free water unavailable and charged attendees 
exorbitant prices for bottled water, making it more difficult to stay hydrated for those who had 
taken the drug. In this sense, the promoters were constructed as motivated solely by profit and 
unconcerned about the potential dangers faced by young MDMA users.  
Strategies pursued by out-groups 
	
Congressional speakers highlighted different strategies used by those in out-groups to promote 
MDMA use. They argued that traffickers recruited innocent-looking couriers and dealers so as to 
entrap vulnerable in-group members into using. As Steven Martin explained: 
The people selling the drug were two kids with backpacks who came 
walking up to sell to the undercover officer. This is a very, very different 
kind of retail sales operation than we sometimes see with other drugs. The 
fact that it is going on that way, and so openly, suggests that we need to 
get some messages across to a variety of audiences. (Ecstasy: 
Underestimating the Threat, 2000, p. 78) 
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Other non-stereotyped groups who were selling the drug included Orthodox Jews, attorneys, 
white teenagers, and senior citizens. The speakers also explained that traffickers were telling 
potential users that MDMA was safer than other illegal drugs. For example, Senator Grassley, 
from Iowa, argued that dealers conveyed the idea that MDMA could be used responsibly 
(Ecstasy: Underestimating the Threat, 2000, p. 2). Congressional speakers also argued that 
manufacturers created attractive-looking MDMA pills but commonly used adulterants in order to 
increase profits.  
Punishing out-groups 
	
As well as allocating responsibility for the MDMA “epidemic” to out-groups and describing 
their marketing strategies, speakers often described the penalties that should be imposed on 
culpable out-groups. These included stiffer penalties to be imposed on traffickers of the drug and 
the targeting of drug dealers for arrest. Some speakers argued that rave venue owners should also 
be punished because they are aware that drug use is taking place on their premises. Legislators 
highlighted the importance of targeting large drug organizations and traffickers that profited 
from young users. Senator Bob Graham, from Florida, stated:  
Just yesterday, the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission recommended new, 
stricter sentencing guidelines for manufacturing, importing, or trafficking 
in Ecstasy. As an example, the current sentence for possession of 8,000 
Ecstasy pills is 40 months. Under the new standards, it will be 120 months. 
That is illustrative of the strengthened sentencing standards which will go 
into effect for those who would traffic in to our young people this 
dangerous drug. (America at Risk: The Ecstasy Threat, 2001, p. 6) 
New Language and New Panics? 
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As these findings show, speakers across all four hearings categorized MDMA users as in-
group members. They argued that MDMA users were different from other drug users because 
they lived in the same communities as the speakers. Additionally, some hearing speakers 
described MDMA users as, at least figuratively, their “own children” whose promise and potential 
as college students and future leaders was threatened by the use of MDMA. Through these 
descriptions, hearing speakers commonly suggested that MDMA users held the same norms and 
belonged within the same in-groups as the speakers. This argument invites the hearing audience to 
identify with MDMA users. Just as Provine (2007, p. 118) found in her analysis of moral 
entrepreneurs’ rhetoric about white, middle-class marijuana users that demanded protection for 
“our children, our cities, our values,” MDMA users are placed within in-groups and described as 
“our children”, which functions to heighten a sense of group solidarity. Punitive proposals target a 
common enemy – members of out-groups. These out-groups include traffickers, manufacturers, 
and dealers, who are constructed as avaricious, uncaring, manipulative, and often foreign.  
The speakers not only distinguished MDMA users from dealers, they also set these users 
apart from the users of other drugs: methamphetamine, crack-cocaine, and heroin. They invoked 
evidence of other drug users’ dangerous behavior to argue that MDMA users were less 
problematic. Provine (2007) illustrated that, in the context of crack-cocaine legislation, 
lawmakers stressed individual responsibility for the moral choice of drug taking and selling, 
while downplaying structural factors associated with involvement in drug trade. In other words, 
crack-cocaine users had a choice and exercised it badly. In this case, MDMA users were 
constructed as sharing norms and values similar to the speakers themselves, which led to more 
empathic approaches and an emphasis on external forces as crucial to involvement in drug use.  
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 By placing MDMA users into an in-group, legislators and other hearing speakers were 
able to propose much more progressive policies to assist MDMA users, especially when 
compared to those proposed in response to crack-cocaine use (Reinarman & Levine, 1994; 
Provine, 2007). The proposed policies in these hearings focused on education and treatment, and 
discouraged the use of mandatory minimum sentences. In the selected hearings, no proposals to 
criminally punish MDMA drug users were advocated. Rather than describing MDMA users as 
dangerous or as deserving of harsh punishment, the Congressional speakers framed MDMA 
users as similarly to users in other white drug scares, who were portrayed sympathetically by 
media in terms of their wasted potential (Netherland and Hansen, 2016). MDMA users were 
described as productive young adults who became victims of the drug. Speakers, including past 
users of the drug, provided humanizing backstories about MDMA addiction, which is consistent 
with Netherland and Hansen’s (2016) findings. As has been the case with media coverage of the 
recent “opioid epidemic” (Netherland and Hansen, 2016), incarceration was never presented as a 
way to manage MDMA use or possession of the drug (see also Provine, 2007 on the 1970s’ 
marijuana policy reform).  
 In contrast, MDMA dealers, manufacturers, traffickers, and other entities were framed as 
out-groups throughout the Congressional hearings. Speakers blamed the out-groups for 
encouraging MDMA use and portrayed them as threats to society. In some instances, these out-
groups were racialized: Mexican and Columbian drug cartel traffickers and Israeli crime groups. 
This finding is consistent with Netherland and Hansen’s analysis (2016), which found that “dirty 
doctors,” operating in suburban communities and described as immigrants and people of color, 
were blamed for the opioid epidemic (Netherland and Hansen, 2016).  
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CONCLUSION 
	
Scholars have described the ways in which moral panics surrounding drug use are 
structured around race and class inequalities (Reinarman & Levine, 1997; Provine, 2007). The 
current analysis demonstrates that the moral panic criteria may not fully apply to drug panics 
arising from white, middle-class drug use. Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) identify a heightened 
level of hostility toward the folk devil group as one key criterion of a moral panic. Even though 
MDMA use in the late 1990s and early 2000s was discussed by moral entrepreneurs as an 
“epidemic,” there was little hostility toward the white, middle-class who were associated with 
the use of the drug. Instead, Congressional speakers directed hostility and blame toward MDMA 
dealers and traffickers.  
This finding may not be surprising to social constructionist scholars who have already 
identified a more positive discourse associated with white, middle-class drug use (Provine, 2007; 
Peterson, 1985; Netherland and Hansen, 2016). Therefore, the current study reiterates the 
findings of social construction theorists: the way in which drug use is constructed as an issue of 
concern is established within larger structures of race and class. It also suggests the utility of a 
social identity analytical framework for distinguishing how illicit acts by different groups come 
to be categorized. In the case of illicit drug involvement, social identity theory offers a micro-
level and dynamic framework for teasing out the conditions under which users and distributors 
are categorized as either deserving of punishment or of care-oriented intervention.  
To conclude, social construction scholars should continue to examine drug scares arising 
from concern over white drug use in order to expand scholarship on the variable effects of race 
and class on the construction of drug problems. The white drug panic framework has a long 
history and has repeatedly framed white, middle class youth as innocent victims who must be 
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protected from the scourge of drugs (Lassiter, 2015). Examples of this framework include LSD 
and marijuana in the 1960s, cocaine in the 1980s, and heroin in the 1990s, and, more recently, 
opioids (Ahrens, 2013; Netherland and Hansen, 2016). Future research should further identify 
the strategies and mechanisms used by individuals in power to construct middle-class, white drug 
users as in-group members, in order to justify protective rather than punitive policy.  
My findings suggest that within moral panics, the hostile response criteria may not 
always apply to the group associated with problematic behavior. Instead, policymakers may be 
more practical and open to evidence-based policies to assist drug users when they identify with 
them as in-group members. The policy challenge, then, is how to expand the in-group to ensure 
that marginalized populations and users of color can also be the beneficiaries of pragmatic and 
health-oriented drug policy.  
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